Reddit reviews Armored Thunderbolt: The U.S. Army Sherman in World War II
We found 5 Reddit comments about Armored Thunderbolt: The U.S. Army Sherman in World War II. Here are the top ones, ranked by their Reddit score.
Stackpole Books
Popular myth, but actually it was the ammo rack that was the source of fire in most cases - a problem mitigated by wet stowage ammo racks in later variants, Source: Armored Thunderbolt by Zaloga
Lets highlight some of the inaccuracies in that WIB article shall we?
>Most tanks at the time ran on diesel, a safer and less flammable fuel than gasoline. The Sherman’s powerplant was a 400-horsepower gas engine that, combined with the ammo on board, could transform the tank into a Hellish inferno after taking a hit.
This isn't true, the only nations using diesel for most (if not all) of their tanks was Russia, Japan, and Italy. Germany didn't field a single diesel powered tank.
Nor is the gasoline the primary point of ignition in these tanks. The ammo, which the article suggests was simply a contributing factor, was the primary issue in burnt out tanks of all nations. Note that everyone's tanks burned quite often when knocked out.
>All it took was a German adversary like the awe-inspiring Tiger tank with its 88-millimeter gun. One round could punch through the Sherman’s comparatively thin armor. If they were lucky, the tank’s five crew might have seconds to escape before they burned alive.
So what? The Tiger was such a rare adversary as to be an immaterial threat in the grand scheme of the war. The Americans for instance only encountered a few from June 6th until the Ardennes Offensive began in December.
And to address you post for a moment:
> the most common german anti-tank gun was the 88 and it could tear a sherman to pieces from beyond the range of the Sherman's own gun
No that isn't even remotely true, the 88 was an exceedingly rare sight in NWE. Only 200 Tiger Is and 204 Tiger IIs fought on the Western Front (out of a total of 4434 Panzers of all types), and fewer than 100 JagdTigers and Nashorns. And 88mm AT guns were just as rare. By far the most common weapon in the German arsenal was the 75mm of various types. It was used in Stugs and Panzer IVs, the two most common AFVs on the Western Front, the Panther, and the Pak 40, which was the standard German AT gun right until the end of the war.
> which was the exact impetus[2] to develop the 76mm high velocity gun for the Sherman.
The 76mm M1 gun began development in 1942, soon after the introduction of the Sherman. It was recognized even then that the 75mm gun wouldn't cut it forever, despite its excellent performance in Africa and Italy.
What actually convinced the Americans to rush the 76mm armed Shermans to the continent was the Panther.
> the german panzerfaust could likewise destroy a sherman[3] and in Normandy close combat, 34% of tank losses were due to those.
Whats your point? A Bazooka could kill any German tank fielded as well, how is this relevant?
Anyway to get back to the WIB article:
>Belton Cooper, author of the appropriately named Death Traps, a study of U.S. armored divisions and their battles in Europe during World War II.
I am speechless... that they would call Belton's memoir a study of any sort just boggles my mind. Would you like to know one of the things he claimed in that "study"? Belton claimed that the name Sherman was created by the DoW to insult Southerners. And thats just one instance where he went wrong. Here
is an article explaining why the book is bad. I can provide more if you would like.
>During the European Campaign, the Division had some 648 Sherman tanks completely destroyed in combat and had another 700 knocked out, repaired and put back into operation. This was a loss rate of 580 percent.
Yup, the war was pretty bad, but lets take a look at what the 3rd Armored did to the Germans, you know, just for some context.
As you can see the 3rd Armored directly destroyed just a little less than 1500 Tanks and SPGs. Those are permanent losses, not those that are knocked out and then repaired. Those are losses what the Germans never got back. The 3rd in contrast suffered 780 permanent light and medium tank losses. So no, the statistics don't actually tell a different story. The Sherman did pretty damn good if you ask me.
>In comparison, the Tiger—clearly the superior tank when compared to the Sherman—was made of costly materials, laboriously assembled and expensive to operate. The Germans manufactured slightly more than 1,300 Tigers.
Well... this is a very simplistic comparison. Let me ask you this, could the Tiger have filled the same role in the US Army as the Sherman did, or even the role of tanks in the Wehrmacht like the Panzer IV or V?
No of course it couldn't, the Tiger was a heavy tank, not a medium. It never could have filled the shoes of the Shermans or T-34s or Panzer IVs, but then it wasn't supposed to. The Tiger was a shit medium tank in the same way that all those mediums were shit heavy tanks.
So no, the Tiger wasn't simply a "superior" tank. The answer to such a comparison is much more nuanced than that, but obviously the author is poorly equipped to deal with such nuances.
>Whether there was another trained tank crew to man the Sherman was more problematic.
The US did have crew shortage issues, but the same issues were being suffered by the Germans. The author is once again taking these things out of context.
>Although its 75-millimeter gun was less potent than German tank guns were,
Except for the most part that didn't matter.German armor was by no means invulnerable to the 75mm M3. Tanks like the Panzer IV, and AFVs like the Stug could be knocked out from normal combat ranges by the 75mm gun. The Tiger and Panthers were tougher nuts to crack, but cracked they were when they had to be. And as I said, the US upgraded the Shermans in response to the Panther.
>Additional weapons included two M1919 Browning .30-caliber machine guns and a Browning .50-caliber M2 on a coaxial turret mount.
Uh... maybe this is just poor wording but the Sherman did not have a 3 machine guns in a coaxial mount, nor was the .50 coaxially mounted.
>Despite its many weaknesses, the Sherman tank became a mainstay for both the U.S. military and armed forces around the world.
All tanks have many weaknesses. But the Sherman was, overall, a good tank. It was largely comparable to its primary adversaries, as well as tanks like the T-34, which it bested in Korea I might add.
Seriously, go read a book that isn't Belton's memoir. I would suggest Armored Thunderbolt for an actual historian's examination of the performance and record of the Sherman.
I got it out of a paper copy of Zaloga's Armored Thunderbolt. But it is also, roughly, in the AskHistorians FAQ WWII section. Most people seem to think the biggest difference was moving the ammo out of the sponsons and basket. The wet storage itself may or may not have helped much. I mean, IDK how water smothers a self-oxidizing explosive.
> That's some pretty bad odds there friendo. Sorry to obliterate your idea that the American tanks were deflecting shots from 88s with their rear armour and flying around on magical American rainbows.
No, thats a strawman.
I am not saying that it had impenetrable Armour (please link me to where I am though). I am saying that it had enough Armour to outmatch the vast majority of the advisories that it faced during the war, while also having a capable gun in conjunction with being very fast and cheap to produce.
In regards to your last point, you do realize that after the ammo storage problems were solved, a ~1944 Sherman crew had one of the highest survival changes for a penetrating hit out of any tank of the war right?
Judging a tank simply on how readily it might burn when knocked out is a pretty narrow metric with which to measure the effectiveness of a tank, and by that metric the Sherman doesn't actually do that poorly. The problem wasn't unique to the Sherman at all but I figured I would back that up with some actual data, and then I wanted to add some actual context to what the Sherman actually was and what it wasn't because I have a feeling that your friend wont simply be convinced just by learning that the Sherman didn't catch fire any more than any other tank did (and less often than some other famous tanks).
So how often the Sherman was considered to burn really depended on the circumstances in which the data was collected. An American study conducted in France for instance found that 65% of Shermans burned when they were knocked out.^1 While a study of the British 8th and 24th Armor Brigades found that about 56% of there tanks burned when knocked out.^1 Another study found that they burned about 80% of the time. These rates all really depended on the sample of course so you are never going to get a single definitive rate.
The causes of this was primarily the storage of ammunition. In the early version of the Sherman, which I will refer to as "small-hatch" Shermans from now on, all of the ammunition was either stored in the turret (the ready-rack) or in the ammunition racks in the sponsons over the tracks. The problem with that location is that most of the time when tanks were knocked out, it was from hits to the sides which meant that the ammunition racks were quite often directly in the line of fire!
Even so, the Sherman was by no means the only offender in this regard. The Panther stored its ammunition in literally the same location, so did the Panzer IV, and the Tiger. This meant that any time these tanks were hit from the side they were very likely to burn. And according to an allied study the Panzer IV was the worst, burning more than 80% of the time.
The American's however recognized this as an issue with the Sherman and quickly set about attempting to fix the issue.
The first thing the US did was to issue an armor applique kit which would be applied in tank depots before being issued to troops in the field. There were four different kits but the one I am referring to can be seen in this picture (ignore the red box). Each of those armor plates were intended to simply increase the thickness of the hull armor over the ammo racks. Eventually the applique armor, on M4A1s at least, was made part of the actual hull casting, but on tanks like the M4, M4A2, M4A3, and M4A4 the applique armor was simply welded on till the production of those tanks ceased.
The applique armor was never seen as the final solution however, and in December 1943 the second generation of Sherman's, or large-hatch Shermans, began rolling off the production lines. This new generation of Shermans included a number of improvements but perhaps the most obvious change was the the front of the hull which can be seen in this picture of a small-hatch and large-hatch M4A3. The important thing to note however is that on the large hatch Sherman there is no applique armor plates.
This was one of the major improvements of the large-hatch Shermans, at least as far as fires go anyway. According to studies conducted by the Ordnance Department the best place for the ammunition was on the floor of the tank, and in some reports they specifically refer to this arrangement as the "Soviet manner", because this was how ammunition was stored in the T-34. So all the ammunition was moved to the floor in armored containers, and the turret basket was removed to allow access to the containers. Another feature that was added was called Wet Storage.
Wet Storage was basically this: all the ammunition boxes which were in the floor were surrounded by a water jacket. The idea was that if the ammunition racks were hit they would be flooded with water and put out any fire. On 75mm armed Shermans the water jacket could hold 38.1 gallons or .366 gallons per round (104 rounds total) and in 76mm armed Shermans 34.5 gallons or .515 gallons per round (71 rounds total).^2
Wet Storage worked extremely well, Shermans equipped with it now burned between 10 - 15% of the time as opposed to the 55 - to 80%^3 of the time, making the Sherman by far the safest tank on the battlefield as far as fires went anyway.
Another thing your friend will probably mention is the Sherman's gas engine, and he will probably cite this as a source of the fires in the Sherman. If he does this, you should point out that all German tanks also had gas engines, and ask why didn't their tanks have the same reputations. (Though they really ought to have anyway, they caught on fire just as often).
Some Myths -
This simply isn't true, and when the evidence is examined you will see that US forces did quite well. In a study of 87 tank engagements involving involving the 3rd and 4th Armored Divisions the US actually destroyed more enemy tanks and equipment then they lost, and in these engagements they were quite often fighting Panthers.^4
In the first 3 examples in the study, which involved a total of 27 engagements, a total of 155 M4s faced off against 114 Panthers. The US lost 10 M4s while the Germans lost 70 Panthers^4.
And the Sherman had been designed from the get go to fight other tanks. In FM 17-10 it states explicitly that both medium and light tanks should be used to fight other tanks. In 1942 the Sherman was more than capable of taking on any tank on the battlefield. Its 75mm gun could kill any German tank at the time and with 90mm of armor on the front of the hull (effective) it was mostly impervious to any German tank except at close range.
This situation remained about the same until mid 44, yes the Panzer 4 was upgunned, but even the 7.5cm KwK L/48 couldnt penetrate the front of the Sherman beyond 1100 meters while the Panzer IV remained vulnerable from about the same distance.
The Panther did outclass the Sherman, there is no doubt of that, and unlike what that other poster said it even outclassed the late war Sherman, but the Panther had its own issues, and while it did outclass the Sherman one on one, it was not so superior that it couldn't be overcome as the study I mentioned showed.
2.It took X number of Shermans to kill Panzer IV/V/VI
This is a very silly claim and there is no basis for it. Keep in mind that the Germans lost more tanks to the US than the US lost to the Germans.
Really, the Sherman was a tank that was comparable to other medium tanks of the era, for instance the T-34. Both tanks were armed and armored in similar ways, and they both served about the same roles in their respective armies. Neither tank was perfect, but they were good enough to do the job that was expected of them and they did them well.
Anyway, I feel that the second part wasn't all the eloquent but I am way past my bed time. If there was anything I did not explain well, let me know and I will clarify, I admit I was sort of pulled in all directions wile trying to put this together.
Oh by the way, the Ronson nickname is almost certainly anachronistic. The "lights first time, every time" was a slogan that didn't come out until the 50s. Ronson did make flamethrowers for Shermans though and I think that is probably where the name came from.
List of sources:
Nice catch with Bluecoat. I'd go on to mention the strategic victory the British achieved was tying up Hausser's forces while the Americans exploited the breakout to the west following Cobra.
> With regard to Market-Garden, and having studied this battle at some length, the claim that Patton's front was a more promising line was very dubious, and Arnhem was a better (though risky) bet.
I'm keeping my response brief since I want to get into the tank contributions that the western allies made; I've always been fascinated by the failures of Market Garden and the hard lessons learned from the battle... but that's another discussion. Anyways - Ike thought so too: If Market Garden worked, Monty would give the Allies direct access to the factories which were not far from the Rhine at Arnhem. That's a very tempting target and I can't blame him. But, I have to simply contend that the counter-point used in regards to the main offensive through France and southern Belgium into Germany near the Saar River and Siegfried Line is: The prize is still entrance into Germany which would have put the Western Allies closer to the end of the war anyways and it might have once again drawn troops out of reserve to contend the region, if not forces from the Ostfront. But by this point in the war, the notion of "what forces?!" was becoming a fast reality for the Germans.
Like I said, skipping the heavy discussion cause it would become speculative... and also argumentative & off of the topic of contributions.
> To say tanks were for infantry support and not for taking on tanks is to reiterate the flawed US armoured doctrine of the Second World War. In fact it was impossible to separate the tasks, as the enemy was seldom co-operative. This is why the 'main battle tank' concept took over, an idea imposed by the facts on the battlefield as much as doctrinal changes.
Oh indeed. The emphasis on the infantry-support tank doctrine was a huge wartime detriment for the Western Allies' ability to fight the often times better armor and strong guns of the German tanks (Tigers and Panthers). So far as contributions by the Americans and the British go, that was one of the weakest ones in the grand scheme of things. Steven Zaloga's [Armored Thunderbolt: The U.S. Army Sherman in World War II](http://www.amazon.com/Armored-Thunderbolt-U-S-Sherman-World/dp/0811704246) is a good read on the Sherman's operational history throughout the war (he even touches on the Pacific). Yes, the Sherman Firefly was very powerful and the M4A3E8 "Easy Eight" with its 76mm gun was a viable second, but those two tanks were still fragile compared to the Panthers and Tigers. Steven's book greatly goes over whether or not the Sherman tank was an asset or a detriment to the Americans [and British].
On the note of Allied tech contributions, the British Archer was an interesting tank destroyer since its gun (QF 17 Pounder) was mounted on the rear of the chassis, but the tank destroyer was designed in such a way that the gun faced backwards, allowing for the drivers to back out of combat situations quickly once they fired their shots. The British saw her as an ambusher that would use its very powerful gun to punch through advancing [heavy] armor.
Meanwhile the Americans emphasized turreted tank destroyers like the M18 Hellcat and the M10 Wolverine: they were lightly armored (compared to tanks), but I'd note the Wolverine was exceptionally slow compared to its lighter brother, and considering its armor was still weak it was not very durable. The important point is that it was weak in mobile battles. Interestingly, the 90mm gun was a nice upgrade used on Hellcats and the M36 Jackson (sticking with TDs) which allowed them to compete with the QF 17 Pounder. The 76mm gun wasn't that bad, but the 17er blew her out of the water.
Jacksons were slightly up-armored by comparison, but for the life of me, why the designers wanted to upgrade the armor of a tank hunter is beyond me if they were still as likely to be damaged at the drop of a hat. My criticisms of the attempts to increase armor in the already fragile tank destroyers the Americans and British used has always bothered me. It doesn't make since because they were meant to be used in support, not as front line tanks.
TL;DR: Market Garden was a controversial snafu thanks to a series of mistakes (see lloyd's post for a few pointed issues); Patton might have been able to push through France into Germany; Allied Tank Destroyers were interesting concepts in ambushing armor and mobile tank-hunting warfare; Steven Zaloga is an expert in US armor.
On a Zaloga note, he has a book on the M18 Hellcat that is also interesting and covers its history as well. Makes for a good read on the turreted TD discussion. The man also wrote the book on Dragoon - not a huge operation, but still an interesting read all the same.