Reddit Reddit reviews ASICMiner Block Erupter Blade 10.7gh/s Miner (Rev2)

We found 2 Reddit comments about ASICMiner Block Erupter Blade 10.7gh/s Miner (Rev2). Here are the top ones, ranked by their Reddit score.

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ASICMiner Block Erupter Blade 10.7gh/s Miner (Rev2)
Fully Tested and Upgraded Asic Revision 2 Blades.10.7= GH/s Output per blade.Aftermarket Heatsinks included and already installed.Kept in Thermal and humidity controlled secured enviroment.Each unit rigorously tested to ensure quality.
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2 Reddit comments about ASICMiner Block Erupter Blade 10.7gh/s Miner (Rev2):

u/JoseJimeniz · 3 pointsr/crypto

You needed to keep reading that answer:

> If, instead, the password is one of the top 10,000 (and crackers have lists!) you have about 13.3 bits of entropy and cracking will succeed in less than a second.

The problem is that people don't use random passwords. I gave an example password that 28 was characters long (using only lowercase letters and a space):

> horse staple battery correct

If we blindly followed the wrong path, we would assume people generate truly random passwords from that alphabet:

jtqoyxog ckpfqwo dxcs kyidai

> 26 lowercase characters + space character
> is an alphabet of 27 characters
>
> 27^28 = 1.197x10^40 combinations
>
> ln(1.197x10^40) / ln(2) = 133 bits

But people don't actually create passwords like that. People use schemes, common patterns. This is when you look at XKCDs excellent comic on the subject:

http://imgs.xkcd.com/comics/password_strength.png

The password i chose wasn't 28 characters of random lowercase characters. The password i chose was four random words, from a dictionary of fairly common words.

People use these patterns in their passwords. I do. You do:

  • hunter2
  • correct horse battery stable
  • h34dph0nes(8

    Password crackers know this. And they are programmed with all kinds of combinations of things humans actually do. Because no human does:

    > w9jiqcje7t (random lowercase and digits)

    There is an excellent password strength library called zxcvbn (named after the bottom row on your keyboard). There are a number of sites that host the GitHub code.

    The one i linked you gave:

  • estimated strength (in bits) 62.86
  • estimated time to crack

    The estimated time to crack depends on how many attempts you can perform in a second. This depends on the password hashing algorithm you use. It also depends if you are performing the attack online or offline.

    How many hashes can perform per second? That depends:

  • if it's an online attack
  • offline
  • throttled
  • easy hash (e.g. SHA2)
  • difficult hash (e.g. bcrypt, scrypt)

    This concept of speed is important. The canonical zxcvbn demo notes this point:

    > Guess times
    >
    > - 100 / hour: throttled online attack
    > - 10 / second: unthrottled online attack
    > - 10k / second: offline attack, slow hash, many cores
    > - 10B / second: offline attack, fast hash, many cores

    A "slow" hash is something like bcrypt or scrypt. A "fast" hash is something like SHA2. There is dedicated hardware out there that can do billions of SHA2 hashes per second:

  • 10.2 GHash/sec
  • 83W
  • $35

    The site said it was it was 62.86 bits. That means you would have to perform:

    > 2^62.86 = 8.37x10^18

    hashes. So we calculate (for one blade)

    hashes / hashesPerSecond
    8.37x10^18 / 10.2x10^9
    = 8.206x10^8 seconds
    = 53 years

    In my comment i said imagine i have 10 of these blades (10 x 10.2x10^9 hashes/sec = 10.2x10^10)

    hashes / hashesPerSecond
    8.37x10^18 / 10.2x10^10
    = 8.206x10^7 sconds
    = 2.602 years

    Short Answer
    ----------

    Why did i say 2.5 years when the calculator said centuries? Because the calculator assumed a slower hashing rate than what i have:

    > - 100 / hour: throttled online attack
    > - 10 / second: unthrottled online attack
    > - 10k / second: offline attack, slow hash, many cores
    > - 10B / second: offline attack, fast hash, many cores
    > - 1T / second: offline attack, custom ASICs

    You can read me here from a year ago with some more information
u/phillipsjk · 2 pointsr/MoneroMining

Re-post from original thread

A Monero ASIC would probably look a lot like option B.

Small, power efficient CPUs (low clock speeds), with independent access to 2MB of SRAM each. All talking on a shared interface to some kind of dispatcher assigning work.

I am thinking of something like this. That thing used 32 hashing chips. Each has their own mircocontroller to half-fake HTTP well enough to get work from a central server; living on the other side of the Ethernet interface.

I suspect a Monero equivalent would be larger though.

Edit: the mining blade is for 2xSHA-256 (like Bitcoin) only. It is obsolete. (my new hashers are like 8X as efficient for the same power use)
Edit2: option B appears to have lots of DRAM, not SRAM (2x512kB L2)