Reddit reviews Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership

Hello OP, I too am looking for a community that engaged in discussions revolving around Chinese politics. I don't think this one, or Sino are good at that. This one seems to be more complaining about living in China with the occasional politics topic, and Sino seems like it is run by Chinese bots praising everything China does. Anyways PM me if you find a community that discusses politics. In terms of getting a better understanding; I think you should read this book:

https://www.amazon.com/Chinese-Politics-Jinping-Era-Reassessing/dp/0815726929/ref=asap_bc?ie=UTF8

https://www.amazon.com/Chinese-Politics-Jinping-Era-Reassessing/dp/0815726929/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1481368442&sr=8-1&keywords=cheng+li

Book.

Edit: Pretty good book. Level headed. Here's an excerpt.

>BROAD CHALLENGES CONFRONTING THE XI LEADERSHIP
The tension between Xi’s concentration of individual power and China’s past practice of collective leadership has become especially significant at a time when the country is confronting many daunting challenges. Over the past several decades, China has been beset by growing wealth disparities, repeated industrial and environmental disasters, resource scarcity, public health and food safety crises, frequent instances of social unrest, and a manual labor shortage in some coastal cities, coinciding with high unemployment rates among college graduates. China’s economy faces serious and interrelated problems, including mounting local debt, the proliferation of shadow banking, overcapacity in certain industrial sectors, and a growing property bubble. The old development model, which relied on export-driven and cheap labor-oriented growth, has come to an end. Chinese labor costs have risen rapidly, and the country can no longer tolerate the previous growth model’s severe damage to the environment, including the pollution of air, water, and soil. But the new consumption-driven, innovation-led, and service sector–centric model has yet to fully take flight.

>Of course, Xi and his generation of leaders did not create these problems; they have largely inherited them from their predecessors. In fact, Xi’s bold economic reform agenda has sought to address many of these issues. Some argue that factional deadlock in collective leadership led to the Hu-Wen administration’s ineffectiveness during the so-called lost decade, when seemingly little could be done to counter rampant official corruption and the monopolization of SOEs. This rationale has apparently bolstered the case for Xi’s more forceful personal leadership.61 If a more balanced factional composition in the PSC leads to infighting, political fragmentation, and policy deadlock, why should China not organize leadership so that power is concentrated in the hands of Xi and his team? If collective leadership assigns each PSC member one functional area and thus leads to political fragmentation and poor coordination, why should more power not be given to the general secretary? If local governments have been the main source of resistance to reform initiatives, why should Zhongnanhai not establish the Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms at various levels of government to facilitate policy implementation? This line of thinking seems to explain the basis for the six-to-one split of the current PSC and Xi’s twelve top leadership posts.
But in consolidating power, Xi also runs a major political risk: If he cannot deliver what he has promised as part of his economic reform agenda, he will not have anyone else with whom to share the blame. The recent stock market crisis in China and the very strong government interference in order to “save the market” reflect Xi’s political vulnerability and his sense of urgency. Xi’s popularity among the general public, including the majority of the middle class, is always subject to change if China’s economic conditions deteriorate.

>Furthermore, Xi’s inclination for monopolizing power has alienated a large swath of China’s public intellectuals, especially liberal intellectuals. They were particularly dismayed in the early months of Xi’s tenure by orders instructing them not to speak about seven sensitive issues: universal values, freedom of the press, civil society, civil rights, past mistakes by the CCP, crony capitalism, and judicial independence.62 In public discourse, some of these topics remain very sensitive or even taboo. Media censorship has tightened under Xi’s leadership, as has the state monitoring and management of research institutes, universities, and NGOs.

>It should be noted that Xi’s politically conservative and economically liberal approach to governing mirrors the method preferred by his predecessors, who always seemed to take one step forward economically while taking a step backward politically. During his famous “Southern Tour” (南巡, nanxun) in 1992, Deng called for greater market reform and economic privatization, while continuing to crack down on political dissent. Jiang broadened the CCP’s power base by recruiting entrepreneurs and other new socioeconomic players, a formulation known as the “Three Represents” (三个代表, sange daibiao), while launching a harsh political campaign against the Falun Gong, an emerging religious group. Hu’s populist appeal for a “harmonious society” sought to reduce economic disparities and social tensions, all while tightening police control of society, especially in regions with a high proportion of ethnic minorities.

>And yet, Xi seems to face deeper and rougher political waters than any Chinese leader since Mao, with the very survival of the party-state resting in his hands. With the revolution in telecommunications and social media, the way China’s authorities manage domestic political issues—from human rights and religious freedom to ethnic tensions and media censorship—has increasingly caught the eye of the Chinese public and the international community. Xi’s decision to prioritize economic reforms may be strategically sound, but he may not be able to postpone much-needed political reform for too long. Xi must make bold, timely moves to implement political reforms—including increasing political openness and expanding the role of civil society—and address issues that are currently preventing China from blossoming into a true innovation-driven economy.
Likewise, Xi’s ambitious anticorruption campaign has not come without serious political risks. Though popular among the Chinese public, this ad hoc initiative may ultimately alienate the officialdom—the very group on which the system relies for steady governance. Ultimately, Xi’s limited crackdown on official corruption should not serve as a replacement for reinforcing the rule of law, adopting institutional mechanisms like official income disclosure and conflict of interest regulations, and, most important, taking concrete steps to establish an independent judicial system in China. Otherwise, it will only be a matter of time before a new wave of official corruption leaves the public cynical about Xi’s true intentions and the effectiveness of his signature campaign.
From an even broader standpoint, China’s history under Mao and Deng was one of arbitrary decisionmaking by one individual leader. This method is arguably unsuitable for governing a pluralistic society amid increasingly active interest group politics. Despite its deficiencies, collective leadership generally entails a more dynamic and pluralistic decisionmaking process through which political leaders can represent various socioeconomic and geographic constituencies. Bringing together leaders from contending political camps with different expertise, credentials, and experiences contributes to the development of more-effective governmental institutions. Common interests in domestic social stability and a shared aspiration to further China’s rise on the world stage may make collective leadership both feasible and sustainable. In this sense, Xi can modify and improve the system of collective leadership, which is still largely experimental. But it would be pretentious and detrimental to attempt to replace most of the rules and norms that have governed elite politics over the past two decades. One simply cannot turn the clock back to the old days of the Mao era, when China was far less pluralistic and far more isolated from the outside world.