Reddit reviews Southern Storm: Sherman's March to the Sea

> When Sherman departed Atlanta on his infamous "March to the Sea one of the things he did was to issue a special field order regarding conduct on the march. This is known as Field Order 120

> Here are a few of the points in the order:

> > IV. "The army will forage liberally on the country during the march.^1 Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of the inhabitants, or commit any trespass,"^2

> The plan was to destroy the South's ability to wage war, as well as their economy. However it wasn't to be wanton destruction either, as such:

> > V. "To army corps commanders alone is intrusted the power to destroy mills, houses, cotton-gins, &c., and for them this general principle is laid down: In districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested no destruction of such property should be permitted; but should guerrillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifest local hostility, then army commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless according to the measure of such hostility."

> In other words, even though cotton drove the economy of the South, only army corps commanders had the power to decide when to destroy them, which meant that rarely would they be destroyed. Cotton bales already produced were almost universally burned though.

> > VI. As for horses, mules, wagons, &c., belonging to the inhabitants, the cavalry and artillery may appropriate freely and without limit. Foraging parties may also take mules or horses to replace the jaded animals of their trains, or to serve as pack-mules for the regiments or bridges. In all foraging, of whatever kind, the parties engaged will refrain from abusive or threatening language^2, and may, where the officer in command thinks proper, give written certificates of the facts, but no receipts, and they will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonable portion for their maintenance.^3

> In practical matters horses and mules were almost universally taken.

> Trudeau neatly summarizes the damage that was done to homes in March to the Sea (with a few notable exceptions such as to the governor's mansion in Miledgville)

> > Also topping the hit lists were government assets at all levels—town, county, state, and national. Almost everything else that suffered—in the built-up areas, at least—was what a later generation of military planners would term collateral damage. Houses unfortunate enough to be located adjacent to priority targets were often caught up in the flames and the general disinclination of Union officers to expend any effort to protect them. Exceptions, where dwellings safely distanced from the approved targets were torched, had a lot to do with circumstances or plain bad luck. The unexpectedly sharp Rebel rearguard action at Sandersville exposed much of the town to Yankee wrath, while blocked roads that held a Federal column in place for a while in Louisville also spelled trouble when bored soldiers turned to mob vandalism. When the columns kept moving and priority targets were sufficiently isolated, collateral damage was minimal.

> In other words, Sherman did not target entire neighborhoods, and for the most part his men did not target entire neighborhoods. He especially did not target the entire civilian population of the South, despite an entire mythology that's been built up about it.

> 1.) In addition Sherman took plenty of food along with him

> > The columns departing Atlanta on November 15–16 were not traveling lean and mean. Packed into more than 2,500 wagons were a twenty-day supply of bread; forty days of sugar, coffee, and salt; and three days’ worth of animal feed. Moving with the lengthy wagon trains were 5,000 cattle, representing a forty-day beef supply. Writing to his surrogate father [Grant]from Savannah, Sherman rejected the notion that he had been ;rash in cutting loose from a base and relying on the country for forage and provisions. I had wagons enough loaded with essentials, and beef cattle enough to feed on for more than a month, and had the census statistics showing the produce of every county through which I desired to pass. No military expedition was ever based on sounder or surer data.

> 2.) Was this rule broken? Of course it was. You don't have an army of 60,000 men marching through enemy territory without it being broken. However there's only one case of rape recorded where we know for sure the victim's name. There are cases of robbery and theft recorded and there seems to be a pretty liberal policy of looking the other way, but bodily harm seems to have been somewhat rare.

> 3.) Even though the Union Army foraged liberally there's not a single case of starvation recorded in the winter after Sherman passed through Georgia. Despite the devastation that's supposed to have been visited upon the people of that state and the endless atrocities, none of them died of starvation--a remarkable feat considering the size of the army that marched through, plus the countless number of slaves that attached themselves to the army.

> Source, Southern Storm by Noah Trudeau

Conclusion?

SHERMAN DID NOTING WRONG

> How did emancipation change the war? Don't have a thesis yet. But shouldn't be too hard.

Couple of things to look at.

1.) Did slaves escaping to find freedom deny labor to the South? If so what kind of labor? Was that labor crucial to the war effort?

2.) Was preventing runaway slaves important enough to the South to divert resources from the war effort to track down slaves/prevent escapees?

3.) Were escaped slaves useful to the Union as labor, soldiers, etc.?

(In at least one example they were, during Sherman's "March to the Sea". Read Noah Trudeau's Southern Storm: Sherman's March to the Sea for more information on that.)

Eric Forner is another good resource.