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u/x_TC_x · 30 pointsr/WarCollege

In essence, and despite all the possible means of keeping secrets safe, nothing was safe, and almost everything was revealed - ironically, neither to own intel or military services, even less so to own public, but certainly to the enemy.

Indeed, the classic example of how much each side actually knew about the other would be the case of Adolf Tolkachev: he revealed 'super-secret' details of an entirely new generation of Soviet-made weapons systems (especially those related to types like MiG-29, MiG-31, and Su-27) to the CIA - even before these have entered service. The Soviet/Russian defence sector never recovered from this blow (indeed: not even until today).

Regarding such cases like that with the T-54: the actual issue is the depth of perception.

Due to the compartmentalization of security-related issues, somebody like, say, a defence attaché in Moscow, was not expected 'to know' plenty of things, say, Langley did already know. In other cases - like that of Tolkachev in particular - the intelligence received so much information, that it took it years to study all of this. Of course, until it was so far, nobody could know all the details. That's why all the possible intel services were still eager to get their hands upon, say, MiG-29 as of the early 1990, although - theoretically - they should've known everything about the type, inside out.

Another 'anecdote' (if you like): we frequently get to hear how the Israelis got that Iraqi MiG-21 in 1966 and then handed it over to the USA. Actually, that story was entirely surplus.

CIA has obtained the flight manual for MiG-21F-13/PF (I've got the translation of the same, dated with 1964, should there be any questions about 'evidence') - from Iraq already in 1963. And not only that manual, but also all the technical documentation about that type, plus everything there was in sense of documentation on SA-2, too.

In that year, there were three coups in that country, already the first of which removed the gov that was 'USSR friendly' (actually: not really, but it did include a C-in-C air force that was a 'staunch communist'). Thus, also in the same year, the IrAF sent a group of its pilots - including nearly all of those who used to fly MiG-21s - to the USA, for advanced staff training. 'In exchange' for that, it delivered everything it's got of Soviet technical and training documentation.

Indeed, even the pilot that later flew that MiG-21 to Israel was with that group, i.e. sent for staff training to the USA: that's how the Israelis 'got' him, in the first place: they assassinated three other Iraqi pilots who turned down their 'silver or lead' offers (the first of them was murdered in a bar in the USA; for details, see Arab MiGs, Volume 2).

However, the CIA never made this public. Thus, 'this all never happened' and all we get to hear is 'the Israelis got a MiG-21 for the USA'. Even more so, due to the compartmentalization of security issues, even the USAF and the USN did not know that the CIA has got the intel they urgently needed for use over North Vietnam, for example.

Something similar was valid for the NSA's success in regards of reading the Soviet IFF: it was already in 1962, over Cuba, that the NSA found out it could not only 'read' the Soviet IFF (installed on MiGs), but actually trigger a response from IFF-transponders that were set on 'passive'. 'Still', resulting technology ('IFF interrogators') was only extremely cautiously applied against North Vietnam starting in 1968, and really deployed 'in combat' only starting in 1971-1972. (For details, see Clashes: Air Combat over North Vietnam).

Funny fact about this: until today I'm to find a single former user of the IFF-transponders in question (i.e. one of former MiG-pilots, no matter where: in the ex-USSR or any of its 'clients') that has at least ever heard of such stuff like APX-80 Combat Tree. I.e. even if the intel of the other side almost certainly learned about such equipment, it didn't left its own 'warfighters' know that the US intel could read their IFF and make tactical use of that fact. No surprise, although the existence of such systems like Combat Tree was reveald in the Western public already in the late 1990s or early 2000s, even most of ex-USAF F-4-pilots are still extremely cautious when one asks them about the APX-80...

Indeed, another funny related fact: when I once interviewed an ex-Iraqi Mirage-pilot, and told him about the use of the Combat Tree by the Iranians during the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988 (they were in the exclusive club of getting such US-high-tech of the early 1970s, together with the Israelis, of course), his reaction was disbelief. 'Why do you have to fantasise and create such science fiction to explain our losses...'

Overall, everything is related to the 'depth of perception': the fact that some secret is actually known to the other side, means not that the other side has left all of its 'trigger pullers' know that it knows.

u/KretschmarSchuldorff · 3 pointsr/WarCollege

Hermann Kahn's On Thermonuclear War & Thinking about the Unthinkable in the 1980s are still go-to texts for nuclear strategy.

The Parallel History Project is a good resource for Early to Mid Cold War era Warsaw Pact warplanning.

The CIA's Historical Collections contain declassified documents regarding US assessments of the WP and Soviet stances, The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers in particular.

For some interesting context, the GWU's National Security archive has some documents showing US intelligence failures.

Unfortunately, you will run into the secrecy wall really quick in this area, since nuclear strategy is more a political strategy, than a strictly military one, and grand strategy like this hangs around a good, long while (for example, I am not aware of any declassified Single Integrated Operational Plans).

u/just_addwater · 7 pointsr/WarCollege

The Making of the Atomic Bomb by Richard Rhodes!

Excellent Pulitzer Prize winning history of the Manhattan program.

u/tdre666 · 3 pointsr/WarCollege

Just started digging into Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerilla by David Kilcullen. So far it's fascinating but I've only had time to get a chapter or two in.

Also got my latest issue of Foreign Affairs last week, I do enjoy the book reviews.

u/whatismoo · 6 pointsr/WarCollege

Submission statement:

Citino gives a wonderful lecture here, along the lines of his previous lectures covering the contents of the previous books on the German army in the 2nd World War. This one is on the topic of the final book in the series (I guess his daughters are all out of college), the german campaigns of 1944-45. Overall a high quality lecture, and a reasonable abbreviation of an excellent book.

Amazon link to book

u/Commisar · 2 pointsr/WarCollege

OP, I'd recommend this as a read:

https://www.amazon.com/Clashes-Combat-North-Vietnam-1965-1972/dp/1591145198

Goes over the differing fighter training and tactics of the USN and USAF in Vietnam.

TL:DR the USN had a different role in mind for the F-4 than the USAF.

u/JustARandomCatholic · 15 pointsr/WarCollege

David Glantz's work on the 1941-1943 era Red Army, Colossus Reborn, contains a section on the development of the artillery branch of the Red Army during that time period. If there are particular figures of note in the Artillery branch, that is where you will find them.

u/socialjusticeorc · 7 pointsr/WarCollege

My usual bible for all things Soviet "Weapons and tactics of the red army" talks about this a little. (this baby https://www.amazon.com/Weapons-Tactics-Soviet-Army-David/dp/0710603525)

Essentially, Soviet technological limits meant that they had to use a slightly larger calibre of gun to achieve comparable performance to western designs.

This goes back to ww2, where, for example, the Soviet 45mm tank gun performed about similar to the German 37mm.

The increased size may have resulted in slightly better high-explosive performance, but that's something you'd have to examine on a gun-by-gun basis.

u/deleted_OP · 2 pointsr/WarCollege

Lots of great answers everyone. I see that I have a lot of reading to do and that is a good thing. Just for anyone also interested I compiled all of the named books into a list and sourced them, for your reading pleasure.



The Accidental Guerrilla by David Kilcullen

Counterinsurgency by David Kilcullen

Out of the Mountains by David Kilcullen

Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam by John Nagl

Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods by John Poole

Modern War: Counter-Insurgency as Malpractice by Edward Luttwak

A Savage War of Peace by Alistar Horne

The Bear Went Over the Mountain by Lester Grau

Invisible Armies by Max Boot

Vid Putivla do Karpat by Sydir Artemovych Kovpac

Fire in the Lake by Frances FitzGerald

Inside Rebellion by Jeremy M. Weinstein

u/dreukrag · 3 pointsr/WarCollege

The whole Arab Migs provides a rather good overview of the several wars and conflicts from the perspetive of Arab airforces.

Taking Sides provides a good overview of america's relationship with Israel

Arabs at war provides a military effectiveness overview but it is extremely biased towards Israel

u/Jon_Beveryman · 3 pointsr/WarCollege

Glantz's stuff has been posted already and he's pretty much the one-stop shop for English language discussion of the Great Patriotic War still. Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941-1943 is, like it says on the tin, a detailed treatment of the 1941-1943 period. His Stumbling Colossus is also a solid treatment of the lead-up to the war from the Soviet perspective, up through about the end of 1941. It gave me a lot of perspective on Soviet force posture prior to the invasion, and it goes a long way towards explaining why the Red Army performed so poorly in the initial period of the war.

Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War

Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War

u/Amtays · 2 pointsr/WarCollege

Ivan's war isn't quite diary level, but it is still a very intimate look at soviet soldiers and their feelings of war.

u/Acritas · 18 pointsr/WarCollege

Anything from Suvorov is not credible at all. See D. Glantz about Resun (aka B. Suvorov)

He provides the most complete and convincing study of why the Soviets almost lost the war that summer, dispelling many of the myths about the Red Army that have persisted since the war and soundly refuting Viktor Suvorov's controversial thesis that Stalin was planning a preemptive strike against Germany.

u/Lmaoboobs · 4 pointsr/WarCollege

Currently: The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran

After this I will probably read

The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan

On War

Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS

The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11

Illusions of Victory: The Anbar Awakening and the Rise of the Islamic State

On Grand Strategy

A fellow on the combined defense discord layed out his recommendations for books on nukes, so I'll list them here.

On Thermonuclear War By Herman Kahn

On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century by Jeffrey Larsen and Kerry Kartchner

The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Third Edition by Lawrence Freedman

Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces by Pavel Podvig

Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age by Francis J. Gavin

Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb by Feroz Khan

Prevention, Pre-emption and the Nuclear Option: From Bush to Obama by Aiden Warren

Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy by Thérèse Delpech

Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy by Charles L. Glaser

Making of the Atomic Bomb by Richard Rhodes

Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb by Richard Rhodes

Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict by Vipin Narang

Building the H Bomb: A Personal History By Kenneth W Ford

The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy by Matthew Kroenig

Paper Tigers: china's Nuclear Posture by Jeffery Lewis

Arms and Influence by Thomas Schelling

u/SmokeyUnicycle · 4 pointsr/WarCollege

What is your background on this topic? I typically assume that people have only a cursory understanding when talking to them online, but this seems not to be the case here.

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>Yes, which is exactly what happened - and then a number of times - during the Iran-Iraq War, especially so during most fierce battles, in 1986-1987.

As in barrels exploded? Or as in the N+1th shot exploded the barrel, these are not the same thing.

>I'm not of the sort 'pedantic argument', or 'mathematically, this is inaccurate', but of the sort, 'goes out, finds Iraqi T-72-tankers, interviews them'. We're living in the times of the internet, after all: it's anything but hard to find them (ironically, reactions by people like Paul and James were very similar to yours - when they were on the receiving end of similar recommendations, back in mid-2000s).

I have no idea who these people are, why are you referring to them by their first names?

What are the recommendations and reactions?

To go find interviews/Iraqi tankers online?

There's a whole book based off of Iran/Iraq war interviews, the one on the F-14s, it's not exactly well regarded as a reliable source.


Nor, honestly can the anecdotes of people who performed so profoundly poorly in combat really be considered that definitive a way of finding out the truth about the events that occurred.

I'm not saying they don't have value, but I'm not sure that pointing at them and saying "there is the truth, reconsider" is advisable.




>Why? Because prejudice and supposition makes people thinking they never took care to carry enough spare barrels with them into training, and especially into the battle?

Well, to be honest this is kind of a form of arguing backwards;

Even when the Iraqis could see there targets and were in range they rarely landed hits.

There must be an explanation for this.

Zaloga and a T-72 blog are not definitive sources, I'll readily admit but I wouldn't consider some hypothetical tanker anecdotes as trumping them either.


You're correct in that I haven't done any serious research on the Iraqi army training. I don't claim to be anything close to an authority.

>try to find yourself few tankers of the former 10th Armoured Brigade (first Iraqi Army unit equipped with T-72s): gents in question have 'books' to say about the type.

Do you have any links?

I would love to read them, I'll look myself when I have time but a starting point would go a long ways.

>My co-author Martin Smisek has found loads of relevant papers (including reports about related negotiations and contracts for Libyan orders, plus Syrian and Iraqi complaints) in archives of the Czech Republic during research for Volumes 4, 5, and 6 of this series: http://www.harpia-publishing.com/galleries/AMV4/index.html - and Volumes 1 and 2 of this series: http://www.amazon.com/Libyan-Air-Wars-Part-1985-1986/dp/1910294535/ref=sr_1_4?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1462253442&sr=1-4
Further to this, there are several biographies by top Iraqi and Syrian military commanders (in Arabic) citing similar issues (even the former C-in-C SyAAF, Moukiiad, is discussing this issue in his auto-biography, published in Damascus in 2001, because he was the boss of Syrian military commission for acquisition, in the 1980s).

I see.

u/Thendisnear17 · 4 pointsr/WarCollege

The best book I have read is :https://www.amazon.com/Zhukovs-Greatest-Defeat-Operation-Paperback/dp/0700614176

It was a major soviet attack with a huge force from three directions to reduce a salient and blow a whole in Army Group Centre's lines. The forces you list are correct for the Soviets, but the Germans had had a much better deployment and used the terrain very efficiently to hinder the attacks.

David Glantz is well respected when it comes to the Soviet side of the eastern front and his causality figures are normally good for the soviets.

It was a German Victory, but after Operation Uranus in the south it didn't change the strategic situation in the south. When researching about the eastern front, you will realize that most of the narrative is wrong. It either comes from German or Soviet records and is normally moved to shift the authors agenda. The biggest problem is that people like to read about bite-size history e.g.

Barbarossa- German victory

Operation Typhoon- German Loss

Case Blue- German Victory

Stalingrad- German Loss

Kursk- German Loss

Bagaration- German Loss

Berlin- German Loss

This way of looking at the war is inaccurate and misses countless battles. Try not to look for "turning points" or "missed opportunities", but rather a continual struggle with the autumn and spring weather as time outs when forces were rebuilt or redeployed and the next offensive planned.

(this is my first comment on this sub, sorry if it is not correct)