Reddit reviews ARAB MIGS VOL. 2: Supersonic Fighters: 1956-1967

In essence, and despite all the possible means of keeping secrets safe, nothing was safe, and almost everything was revealed - ironically, neither to own intel or military services, even less so to own public, but certainly to the enemy.

Indeed, the classic example of how much each side actually knew about the other would be the case of Adolf Tolkachev: he revealed 'super-secret' details of an entirely new generation of Soviet-made weapons systems (especially those related to types like MiG-29, MiG-31, and Su-27) to the CIA - even before these have entered service. The Soviet/Russian defence sector never recovered from this blow (indeed: not even until today).

Regarding such cases like that with the T-54: the actual issue is the depth of perception.

Due to the compartmentalization of security-related issues, somebody like, say, a defence attaché in Moscow, was not expected 'to know' plenty of things, say, Langley did already know. In other cases - like that of Tolkachev in particular - the intelligence received so much information, that it took it years to study all of this. Of course, until it was so far, nobody could know all the details. That's why all the possible intel services were still eager to get their hands upon, say, MiG-29 as of the early 1990, although - theoretically - they should've known everything about the type, inside out.

Another 'anecdote' (if you like): we frequently get to hear how the Israelis got that Iraqi MiG-21 in 1966 and then handed it over to the USA. Actually, that story was entirely surplus.

CIA has obtained the flight manual for MiG-21F-13/PF (I've got the translation of the same, dated with 1964, should there be any questions about 'evidence') - from Iraq already in 1963. And not only that manual, but also all the technical documentation about that type, plus everything there was in sense of documentation on SA-2, too.

In that year, there were three coups in that country, already the first of which removed the gov that was 'USSR friendly' (actually: not really, but it did include a C-in-C air force that was a 'staunch communist'). Thus, also in the same year, the IrAF sent a group of its pilots - including nearly all of those who used to fly MiG-21s - to the USA, for advanced staff training. 'In exchange' for that, it delivered everything it's got of Soviet technical and training documentation.

Indeed, even the pilot that later flew that MiG-21 to Israel was with that group, i.e. sent for staff training to the USA: that's how the Israelis 'got' him, in the first place: they assassinated three other Iraqi pilots who turned down their 'silver or lead' offers (the first of them was murdered in a bar in the USA; for details, see Arab MiGs, Volume 2).

However, the CIA never made this public. Thus, 'this all never happened' and all we get to hear is 'the Israelis got a MiG-21 for the USA'. Even more so, due to the compartmentalization of security issues, even the USAF and the USN did not know that the CIA has got the intel they urgently needed for use over North Vietnam, for example.

Something similar was valid for the NSA's success in regards of reading the Soviet IFF: it was already in 1962, over Cuba, that the NSA found out it could not only 'read' the Soviet IFF (installed on MiGs), but actually trigger a response from IFF-transponders that were set on 'passive'. 'Still', resulting technology ('IFF interrogators') was only extremely cautiously applied against North Vietnam starting in 1968, and really deployed 'in combat' only starting in 1971-1972. (For details, see Clashes: Air Combat over North Vietnam).

Funny fact about this: until today I'm to find a single former user of the IFF-transponders in question (i.e. one of former MiG-pilots, no matter where: in the ex-USSR or any of its 'clients') that has at least ever heard of such stuff like APX-80 Combat Tree. I.e. even if the intel of the other side almost certainly learned about such equipment, it didn't left its own 'warfighters' know that the US intel could read their IFF and make tactical use of that fact. No surprise, although the existence of such systems like Combat Tree was reveald in the Western public already in the late 1990s or early 2000s, even most of ex-USAF F-4-pilots are still extremely cautious when one asks them about the APX-80...

Indeed, another funny related fact: when I once interviewed an ex-Iraqi Mirage-pilot, and told him about the use of the Combat Tree by the Iranians during the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988 (they were in the exclusive club of getting such US-high-tech of the early 1970s, together with the Israelis, of course), his reaction was disbelief. 'Why do you have to fantasise and create such science fiction to explain our losses...'

Overall, everything is related to the 'depth of perception': the fact that some secret is actually known to the other side, means not that the other side has left all of its 'trigger pullers' know that it knows.

The whole Arab Migs provides a rather good overview of the several wars and conflicts from the perspetive of Arab airforces.

Taking Sides provides a good overview of america's relationship with Israel

Arabs at war provides a military effectiveness overview but it is extremely biased towards Israel