Reddit reviews Clashes: Air Combat over North Vietnam, 1965–1972

The overarching problem with 'early air-to-air missiles' - no matter if in the USA, France or the former USSR - was that at the same time these came into being,

a) nobody had serious/dependable ideas what future (air) wars would look like; and

b) the technological development distanced itself from 'trigger-pullers'.

I.e. the idea was born that 'scientists know better' than warfighters.

Threat perceptions driving the development of early AAMs were a mix of experiences from Korean War and the requirement to intercept high/fast-flying bombers.

The Korean War 'taught' nearly everybody involved that flying higher is an advantage: the Westerners saw high-flying MiG-15s as the primary fighter-type threat. Development of big, fast bombers that were expected to fly at dynamic altitudes (above 18,000m/59,000ft) was pointing in similar direction. Both resulted in development of 'related' fighter aircraft and weapons: say, from West towards the East, the AIM-9B-armed F-104A Starfighter in the USA, Mirage IIIC in France, and MiG-21F in the former USSR.

To make sure, the idea was 'confirmed' by experiences from the Taiwan Crisis of 1958, when AAM-N-7-armed F-86Fs managed to kill at least two higher-flying MiGs (and that although, but also 'precisely because') again proving unable to fly as high as the MiGs (see, not knowing the USMC deployed a small team to adapt AAM-N-7s on a small number of Taiwanese Sabres, Chinese MiGs were still flying their usual 'orbits' high above Sabres, not expecting to get attacked at all; i.e. there was an element of 'strategic surprise' in the entire story).

So, why not? The USN then followed with the idea of getting an even better armed interceptor: the F4H, equipped with longer-ranged SARH-AAMs that packed a heavier punch (necessary to kill bombers).

Nearly nobody involved in all of related R+D had any kind of combat experience. Sure, Kelly Johnson chatted with USAF's F-86-pilots before designing the F-104A, but that was where it ended; the F4H was originally envisaged as a brute fighter-bomber, capable of hauling 3,000kg+ of bombs at Mach 1, and armed with four 20mm cannons; the entire NATO then ordered thousands of F-104Gs as low-flying fighter-bombers armed with 'tactical' nukes; Franco-Israeli cooperation was not yet as close as it got once the two countries began the joint development of nukes (in 1957-1958); while the Soviets drew similar conclusions to USAF's F-86-pilots and thus designed the MiG-21 almost along the same idea like Lockheed designed the Starfighter (which is why it was a 'MiG' after all: the design bureau was specialized in constructing high-altitude interceptors already since WWII). Experiences from such 'minor' wars like the Suez Crisis of 1956 were simply ignored.

The industry then took over the control and that resulted in insufficient testing: i.e. it wasn't taht the designers did not care. They cared - about their profits - and then to a degree where bribing involved military decision-makers (if by no other means then by taking care about their future jobs) became as common and as widespread as it is nowadays.

Result was that, if at all, the AAM-N-7 (future AIM-9B), AAM-N-2/3/6 (future AIM-7A/B/C) underwent minimal, and then testing under unrealistic conditions.

...and nobody cared about such topics like 'field handling' of AAMs...

By the early 1960s, the things then went entirely out of control: in essence, and just like towards the end of the WWII (when first British bomber-manufacturers, and then the Boeing in the USA began imposing the 'bomber solution' upon politicians), the defence sector began dictating to the military and political decision-makers what they need and what they should get and what not. The result was an entire generation of hopelessly overcomplex, poorly-tested combat aircraft, and corresponding guided missiles, majority of which was entirely unsuitable for fighting a war - no matter of what kind - but all of which were ever bigger, ever more complex, and ever more expensive. In the USSR this went as far as that the development of the MiG-23 in the 1960s was still pursued along similar philosophy, resulting in a type that was nearly a decade late, but which couldn't be abandoned because it was too costly by the time it finally reached a status suitable for series production (in 1970-1972 period).

Worse yet: convinced their 'scientists know better', the Soviets overslept most of the 1960s 'knowing' the R-3S and similar stuff was 'perfectly effective and enough' for the way they expected to fight their future wars.

Thus, IMHO, saying 'missile technology was not mature' is wrong: missile technology of the 1950s was perfectly mature - for the 'way of thinking' of its time. That for the 1960s too. What was immature were the contemporary testing prior to service entry, and threat perceptions: testing costs fortunes, and the industry wasn't keen to waste money of it. And the US military services were simply preoccupied preparing for fighting a nuclear war against the USSR - and thus trained for delivery of nukes, and not for dogfighting MiGs in some piss-corner of Asia. Only plenty of 'bitter pills' from such 'local wars' like Vietnam (at least in the USA), or else (USSR), have eventually resulted in the military re-imposing itself as the 'driving force' in regards of further R+D upon the defence sector... at least (indeed: only) for a while...

In the case of France, the situation was slightly simpler: the Dassault there simply had to secure export orders in order to survive, and dependence on exports resulted in dependence on listening to the customer's demands. The result was that the Mirage IIIC was 'converted' into a viable combat system as first - though even then: it took 'even' the Israelis plenty of missing with French-made R.530s during diverse of skirmishes with Jordanians and Syrians of 1964-1966 period to definitely conclude that the only AAM available as of that time was not the way to go, at least not for the time being (surely enough, the Israelis also scored one kill with one of their R.530s, but then it turned out this was actually an accident: the fire-control system of the IIICJ in question was set on 'automatic' and fired on its own as soon as it achieved a lock-on).

The USN went its own way, and ordered the industry to develop the AIM-9D. I.e. to adapt the technology to the actual requirement. The USAF followed a different way of thinking: delivery of nukes remained a paramount issue in regards of training, fundamental weaknesses of which were expected to be solved by yet more advanced technology (see: AIM-9J, AIM-7E-2, F-4E Mod. 556, etc.)...and both quickly abandoned a number of promising solutions (see AIM-95 Agile/AIM-82 as some of numerous examples).

Finally, the Soviets were the slowest in accepting reality: they not only proved extremely poor in their studies of experiences from Vietnam, or advice-resistant to the demands of their (far more combat-experienced) customers elsewhere, but it took them until MiG-23 was easily outfought by older types (especially MiG-21s) to realize that they might need 'advanced' AAMs in the future. That's what in turn resulted in much belated development of R-13, R-60 etc., and then the R-24, in early 1970s.

Now, I would not say there is one source of reference for discussing all of this. I would say there might be a handful to 'single out', like Marshall L Mitchel III's Clashes, or 'Like a Bolt out of Blue' (a book on the Israeli Defence Force/Air Force in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, published in Hebrew, in Israel, next to unknown even there, and surely never translated into English... so much so, can't recall the - excellent - author right now). For the French, one might want to read quite a number of diverse publications, especially little-known ones never translated into English. The situation is similar in the case of the Soviets: indeed, my 'recommended starting point' would be the acquisition of what the USAF's Foreign Technologies Division (FTD) called 'Fishbed C/E Tactics' when translating the tactical manual for the MiG-21F/PF acquired from Iraq, back in 1963-1964 (is not easy to find, but can be bought from people selling tactical manuals online) - and then lots of digging through the (extremely scarce, but meanwhile available) literature detailing Arab air combat experiences and their relations to Soviet 'advisors' from the 1960s and 1970s.

I have done some reading on the matter, and actually am doing it. Apart from a bunch of Osprey books, I just finished Clashes: Air Combat over North Vietnam, 1965–1972. The "overwhelming horde" paradigm is incorrect: both pilots and aircraft were available in limited numbers, especially relative to the combined might of the US Air Force (off multiple bases in South Vietnam and Thailand) and Navy (operating 3 carriers at peak) and used judiciously. But these numbers were used to their advantage by, as you say, GCI, plus the availability of divert bases to escape in China. More importantly however, were the poor technical capacity of US aviation to fight the type of air war in Vietnam (shoddy missiles, no cannon, poor dog-fighting ability, inferior performance of F-104, etc.). In the early days, superbly trained and experienced US fighter pilots were able to pick up the slack, but as training and (specifically, fighter pilot) experience dropped later, it had some horrible consequences, exemplified in the 3:2 kill ratio in favor of the Mig's vs. the US aircraft in Rolling Thunder. After a deep "George Forman-esque" contemplative crises, both the Air Force and the Navy came to opposite conclusions about what needed to be done. The Air Force made (arguably, piddling) improvements to their missiles and doubled-down on some crappy tactics and training strategy (A2A training was actually bumped down in priority, for various dumb reasons!!!). The Navy, on the other hand, came up with Top Gun. Linebacker was the arena for the rematch. The Navy way won the day, though the Air Force also showed improvements. Incidentally, the most effective MiG killer of the war was the (Navy) F-8, mainly due to (a) superlative training, experience, skills, and confidence of the dedicated fighter pilots and (b) the cannon. I highly, highly, highly, highly, recommend this book. Lots of nuts-and-bolts details, operational and otherwise, with great description of actual engagements.

The complexity of the Vietnam air war would take an enormous amount of development effort to address. Sure, one can cut many corners, but only at the risk of failing to satisfy the "good and modern" criteria you outline.

What kind of complexity? Well, this page is a good summary that just scratches the surface. Then there's Clashes, A Lonely Kind of War: Forward Air Controller, Vietnam, Combat Tree, the Thanh Hóa Bridge, etc etc. Just imagine trying to address a lot of this kind of stuff in a sim. Doable, but a tremendous amount of work. Who will be the one to do it in an economically feasible way?

OP, I'd recommend this as a read:

https://www.amazon.com/Clashes-Combat-North-Vietnam-1965-1972/dp/1591145198

Goes over the differing fighter training and tactics of the USN and USAF in Vietnam.

TL:DR the USN had a different role in mind for the F-4 than the USAF.