Reddit reviews Zhukov's Greatest Defeat: The Red Army's Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942 (Modern War Studies (Paperback))

The best book I have read is :https://www.amazon.com/Zhukovs-Greatest-Defeat-Operation-Paperback/dp/0700614176

It was a major soviet attack with a huge force from three directions to reduce a salient and blow a whole in Army Group Centre's lines. The forces you list are correct for the Soviets, but the Germans had had a much better deployment and used the terrain very efficiently to hinder the attacks.

David Glantz is well respected when it comes to the Soviet side of the eastern front and his causality figures are normally good for the soviets.

It was a German Victory, but after Operation Uranus in the south it didn't change the strategic situation in the south. When researching about the eastern front, you will realize that most of the narrative is wrong. It either comes from German or Soviet records and is normally moved to shift the authors agenda. The biggest problem is that people like to read about bite-size history e.g.

Barbarossa- German victory

Operation Typhoon- German Loss

Case Blue- German Victory

Stalingrad- German Loss

Kursk- German Loss

Bagaration- German Loss

Berlin- German Loss

This way of looking at the war is inaccurate and misses countless battles. Try not to look for "turning points" or "missed opportunities", but rather a continual struggle with the autumn and spring weather as time outs when forces were rebuilt or redeployed and the next offensive planned.

(this is my first comment on this sub, sorry if it is not correct)

>What are some more famous examples of Zhukov's successes/failures

See David Glantz - Zhukov's Greatest Defeat: The Red Army's Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942 "Operation Mars".

It was discussed earlier in this thread:

https://www.reddit.com/r/WarCollege/comments/47ceer/counterpoint_to_stalingrad_operation_mars/d0drvf1

On my opinion Glantz dwells too much on Zhukov's actions (and failures) while Konev's and Purkaev's escape scrutiny. But certainly Zhukov is responsible too and has to shoulder his portion of blame.

Prior to "Mars", there was unsuccessful attempt (1^st of many) to cut down Vyazma's salient by attacking from 2 sides. 33^rd Army as a result was encircled, sustained very heavy losses, LtGen Efremov shot himself to avoid captivity. Again, not completely Zhukov's fault IMO - as Stavka's, Efremov's and actions of several other army-level commanders are also to blame.

>weaknesses

Early in WWII he routinely overestimated RKKA performance and underestimated resilience of german defenses, ability to reinforce quickly and to counter-attack immediately. That could be traced all the way back to Yelnya.

Sometimes Zhukov was too quick to assign blame. And once he disliked a person, he could be very biased and vindictive. For example, he blamed only LtGen Efremov (KomandArm-33) for encirclement of his army (late 41-early 42). Per anecdotal evidence, he didn't like Efremov as a person. He described Efremov in "characteristic" (official document for routine performance evaluation in RKKA) as poorly performing commander, not fit to command army, worth to lead division at best. Later, in his memoirs he gave him glowing description.

Zhukov in general tended to go tough on people (even his "best" were often reprimanded - e.g. Katukov), unforgiving to small mistakes. Did not hesitate to dispense punishments.

Per memoirs, Rokossovsky was considered to be "easier" on soldiers and officers under his command, more caring. Whereas Zhukov was respected (of course), but often with reservations out of fear for tough battles ahead.